RamsesX RAM

Payout off peakRank#8▲2Score54

Paid to holders this week: 23% of the best week in 90 days ($59k against $259k), while revenue +8% over 30 days. Also: part of holders revenue is paid out.

Dexs, Hyperliquid L1, Arbitrum, Polygon +2, 191 days of data

Active signals 1

Multiple below medianheld since Oct 1
Multiple 0.7×, below the 19.5× median of Dexs (13 tokens).

Market cap

$2.2M

price $0.0245 · 7d −33.0% · 30d −8.7%

FDV $6.3M (2.8× market cap)

source defillama

Counted per year

$3.4M

holders revenue of the last 30 days, $368k, × 365 ÷ 30, × type factor 0.75 (a mixed model counts 75%)

Mixedbuyback share 97%

Returns 200% of its market cap a year, using 97¢ of every $1 it earns.

Not a buyback: counts for 75% in the multiple (type factor 0.75), so the denominator is $3.4M instead of $4.5M.

Multiple

0.7×

peer median 19.5× (Dexs, 13 tokens), against 0.7× here

Run-rate

1.0×

last 7 days $59k × 52 × 0.75 (type factor) = $2.3M a year

last week's payout to holders ran at 69% of the 30-day pace: the payout is slowing

What we checked

Valuation
Multiple 0.7× (type factor 0.75: a mixed model counts 75%), 29.2× cheaper than its Dexs peers (median 19.5×, 13 tokens). The group's largest earner Uniswap trades at 37.3×: 55.9× cheaper per dollar returned to holders. On total revenue: 0.5×, 34.9× cheaper than the revenue peer median.
Distribution
Mixed: Part buyback, part distribution or burn; the exact split is not known. Holders got $368k of $381k revenue in 30 days → buyback share 97%. DefiLlama: “Bribes to holders: All bribes go to holders”
Sustainability
Holders were paid on 30 of 30 days (100%); largest single day 17% of the month's holders revenue; paid to holders this week: 23% of the best week in 90 days (more than half below peak). Revenue −30% over 7 days and +8% over 30 days, price −9% over 30 days.

What this does not tell you

The figures come from DefiLlama's adapter for each child protocol. Only a few tokens have an on-chain check (see How the buyback really works); for the rest, whether the tokens were really bought, burned or parked in a treasury wallet is not checked here. Unlocks count where DefiLlama or our research has a vesting schedule; team discretion and liquidity depth only once researched.

Flags

Payout >50% below peakthis week's holders revenue is 23% of its best week in the last 90 days ($259k)

How the buyback really works

Not researched yet. Everything above comes from DefiLlama and market data only.

Holders revenue / revenue (30d): $368k / $381k; last 30 closed days
To holders: Returns 200% of its market cap a year
FDV / dilution: $6.3M / 2.8×; FDV ÷ market cap
Price 7d / 30d: −33.0% / −8.7%
Revenue growth 7d / 30d: −30% / +8%; versus the period before
Divergence: 0.17; revenue growth minus price growth, 30d
DEX liquidity: $1.0M; DexScreener, representative pools
24h volume: $1.0M; all markets, CoinGecko
Unlocks 30d: —; DefiLlama's schedule does not cover the next 30 days while tokens are still locked
Revenue multiple: 0.5×; market cap ÷ revenue per year
Fee multiple: 0.2×; market cap ÷ fees per year
Distance to peak: 23%; this week ÷ best week of 90 days
Data since: May 5; first day with holders revenue

Holders revenue and price

Holders revenue per day7-day averagePrice (right axis)▲ ▼ signal days (history below)

Multiple over time

today 0.7× (scored) · peer median 19.5×

Market cap at close ÷ (holders revenue of the previous 30 days × 365 ÷ 30), with holders revenue capped at revenue and × the type factor: the same effective multiple as the peer median. Values above 100× are drawn at the top. Bands as on the meter; dashed line = peer median today.

Signal history

Signal history of this token: date, type, price at the signal, price after 7 and 30 days, change since the signal and the outcome
Date	Signal	Price then	After 7d	After 30d	Since	Outcome
October 1, 2026	Multiple below medianactive	$0.0357	−23%	—	−31%	not counted

Versus peers

Dexs · 13 tokens · median multiple 19.5× · Uniswap is valued 1655.2× higher. Per dollar that counts for holders, RamsesX is 55.9× cheaper.

Main-ranking peers only. Multiples count holders revenue capped at revenue, × the type factor (buyback 1 · buyback + burn 1 · burn 0.75 · mixed 0.75 · distribution 0.5 · unclear 0.5 · ve-distribution 0.25).

This token against its main-ranking peers: multiple, revenue multiple, buyback share, holders revenue, market cap and revenue growth
Token	Distribution	Multiple	Revenue multiple	Buyback share	To holders 30d	Market cap	Rev. growth 30d
Pharaoh Exchange	ve / bribes	0.3×	0.2×	100%	$1.3M	$2.6M	−52%
RamsesXthis token	Mixed	0.7×	0.5×	97%	$368k	$2.2M	+8%
nest	Distribution	0.8×	0.4×	100%	$869k	$4.4M	+32%
up	ve / bribes	2.0×	1.0×	100%	$313k	$3.9M	−68%
Chainflip	Buyback + burn	5.4×	5.4×	100%	$520k	$34.4M	+59%
Aero	ve / bribes	8.7×	4.0×	96%	$7.4M	$372.0M	−6%
PancakeSwap	Buyback + burn	19.5×	12.8×	65%	$2.4M	$563.6M	−29%
Raydium	Buyback	27.1×	16.8×	62%	$1.3M	$425.4M	−65%
Curve Finance	ve / bribes	29.3×	11.1×	94%	$2.6M	$374.4M	+44%
Uniswapleader	Buyback + burn	37.3×	37.3×	100%	$8.2M	$3.71B	−20%
Orca	Buyback	47.8×	7.9×	16%	$130k	$75.6M	−36%
Aster	Buyback + burn	50.2×	∞	—	$2.8M	$1.69B	—
Meteora	Distribution	180×	5.2×	18%	$458k	$161.9M	−60%

Score build-up54 of 100

Total score = 35% valuation + 25% momentum + 20% divergence + 20% quality − penalties, clamped to 0–100. Every number here can be recomputed from the figures on this page.

54of 100#8▲2top 14%

Valuation 35.0Momentum 8.9Divergence 2.2Quality 13.0penalties −5= 54.1

Valuation35%

100Valuation 100.0: HR half 100.0 (multiple 0.67×; 100 at ≤3×, 0 at ≥100×, log scale), revenue half 100.0 (revenue peer value 34.91×; 0 at ≤0.33×, 50 at 1×, 100 at ≥3×, log scale).Average of two halves. HR half: linear in log(multiple), 100 at ≤ 3×, 0 at ≥ 100×, 0 without effective HR. Revenue half: linear in log(revenue peer value), 0 at ≤ 0.33×, 50 at 1×, 100 at ≥ 3×; neutral 50 when the peer group falls back to the universe.

Momentum25%capped

35Momentum 35.5: m = 0.5·g7 −0.350 + 0.3·(ln(day jump 0.87) clamped ±1.5 = −0.144) + 0.2·g30 0.075 = −0.203; 0 at ≤−0.7, 50 at 0, 100 at ≥1.1.m = 0.5·g7 + 0.3·ln(day jump, clamped ±1.5) + 0.2·g30; 0 at m ≤ −0.7, 50 at 0, 100 at ≥ 1.1. Neutral 50 when g7 or g30 is missing; a missing day jump counts as 0.

Divergence20%capped

11Divergence 11.0: d = g30 − p30 = 0.166; 0 at ≤0, 100 at ≥1.5.d = max(0, g30 − p30) when g30 > 0; 0 at d ≤ 0, 100 at d ≥ 1.5, linear.

Quality20%

65Quality 65.1: mean of days HR>0 100% → 100.0 (0 at ≤30%, 100 at ≥90%), largest day 17% of HR30 → 95.2 (0 at ≥60%, 100 at ≤15%), distance to peak 0.23 → 0.0 (0 at ≤0.25, 100 at ≥0.9).Average of: share of days with HR > 0 (0 at ≤ 30%, 100 at ≥ 90%), 1 − largest day ÷ HR30 (0 at ≥ 60%, 100 at ≤ 15%) and distance to peak (0 at ≤ 0.25, 100 at ≥ 0.9).

Penalty −5 (dilution_above_2): dilution ratio 2.81 above 2.

HR7 is below 50% of its 90-day peak: momentum and divergence are capped at 50. This is not a penalty; the distance already counts in quality.

Penalties−5

−5Dilution ratio above 2dilution ratio 2.81 above 2

9 rules not applied, 3 wait for research data.

Where the numbers come from

Revenue source: 5 active children; DefiLlama adapter per child
Price and market cap: defillama / defillama; latest fetch
Scored on: November 11, 2026; as-of date of the last compute run
On-chain verified: not yet; not checked yet

Protocols behind this token5 at DefiLlama

Per protocol: DefiLlama's methodology text, the distribution type we read from it and the sentence that decided it. The token takes the type of the protocol that returns the most to holders.

Ramses Legacy
Dexs · Arbitrum
type ve-distribution · source label
“Bribes to holders: All bribes go to holders”
Swap fees and bribes going to holders.
Bribes to holders
All bribes go to holders
Swap Fees to holders
75% of swap fees go to the holders
adapter on GitHub ↗
Ramses CL
Dexs · Arbitrum
type ve-distribution · source label
“Bribes to Voters: External bribes paid to influence gauge votes, paid out entirely to token holders who vote.”
72% of swap fees allocated to token holders, plus all bribes paid to holders who vote.
Bribes to Voters
External bribes paid to influence gauge votes, paid out entirely to token holders who vote.
Tokenholder fees
72% of swap fees, allocated to token holders.
adapter on GitHub ↗
Ramses CL V2
Dexs · Hyperliquid L1, Arbitrum, Polygon, Robinhood Chain, Elysium
type mixed · source label
“Swap Fees to holders: Voter share of swap fees, plus the treasury share accrued while routed to the Sarcophagus or Buyback Module.”
Swap fees allocated to xRAM voters, the treasury share that accrued while it was routed to the Sarcophagus or Buyback Module (Robinhood Chain from 2026-08-16 20:26:47 UTC, Elysium from launch), and external bribes. Swap fees count only swaps the Ramses subgraph priced in USD. This is an allocation at fee accrual, not a measurement of executed buybacks or burials.
Bribes to holders
External bribes paid to voters.
Swap Fees to holders
Voter share of swap fees, plus the treasury share accrued while routed to the Sarcophagus or Buyback Module. In the hour of the Robinhood routing change, the treasury share is split by the time before and after the change.
adapter on GitHub ↗
Ramses DLMM
Dexs · Robinhood Chain, Elysium
type mixed · source label
“Swap Fees to holders: Voter share of swap fees, plus the treasury share accrued while routed to the Sarcophagus or Buyback Module.”
Swap fees allocated to xRAM voters, the treasury share that accrued while it was routed to the Sarcophagus or Buyback Module (Robinhood Chain from 2026-08-16 20:26:47 UTC, Elysium from launch), and external bribes. Swap fees count only swaps the Ramses subgraph priced in USD. This is an allocation at fee accrual, not a measurement of executed buybacks or burials.
Bribes to holders
External bribes paid to voters.
Swap Fees to holders
Voter share of swap fees, plus the treasury share accrued while routed to the Sarcophagus or Buyback Module. In the hour of the Robinhood routing change, the treasury share is split by the time before and after the change.
adapter on GitHub ↗
Ramses Legacy V2
Dexs · Hyperliquid L1, Polygon, Arbitrum, Robinhood Chain, Elysium
type mixed · source label
“Swap Fees to holders: Voter share of swap fees, plus the treasury share accrued while routed to the Sarcophagus or Buyback Module.”
Swap fees allocated to xRAM voters, the treasury share that accrued while it was routed to the Sarcophagus or Buyback Module (Robinhood Chain from 2026-08-16 20:26:47 UTC, Elysium from launch), and external bribes. Swap fees count only swaps the Ramses subgraph priced in USD. This is an allocation at fee accrual, not a measurement of executed buybacks or burials.
Bribes to holders
External bribes paid to voters.
Swap Fees to holders
Voter share of swap fees, plus the treasury share accrued while routed to the Sarcophagus or Buyback Module. In the hour of the Robinhood routing change, the treasury share is split by the time before and after the change.
adapter on GitHub ↗